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We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal,
possibly ﬁrm-speciﬁc, emissions taxes and their enforcement under incomplete
information about ﬁrms’ abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage.
We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance
by every ﬁrm, except possibly when a regulator can base the probabilities of detecting
individual violations on observable correlates of violators’ actual emissions. Moreover,
optimality requires discriminatory taxes, except when a regulator is unable to use
observable ﬁrm-level characteristics to gain some information about the variation in
ﬁrms’ abatement costs or monitoring costs.
& 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In a ﬁrst-best world, an optimal tax to control emissions of a uniformly mixed pollutant involves a uniform per unit tax
set equal to marginal damage at the efﬁcient level of aggregate emissions. Alternatively, competitive emissions trading with
either freely allocated or auctioned permits will generate a uniform price for pollution that is the same as the ﬁrst-best tax.
In a ﬁrst-best world, however, regulations do not have to be enforced and regulators have complete information about all the
beneﬁts and costs of pollution control. These assumptions are always violated in real-world applications. In this paper, we
consider the optimal pricing of pollution when compliance must be enforced and regulators have only incomplete
information about ﬁrms’ abatement costs, the costs of regulatory enforcement, and the damages from pollution. Our model
is cast as the joint determination of optimal, possibly ﬁrm-speciﬁc, emissions taxes and their enforcement.
Our efforts produce several new results. After laying out a model of emissions tax compliance in the next section, in
Section 3 we determine ﬁrm-speciﬁc tax/enforcement policies that achieve an uncertain distribution of individual
emissions with minimum expected enforcement costs. A key feature of our work is that we assume that it is costless to
collect emissions taxes, but that it is costly to collect penalties for tax evasion. We ﬁrst demonstrate that under a constant
expected marginal penalty for tax evasion, a cost-effective tax/enforcement policy requires sufﬁcient enforcement effort to
induce full compliance by all ﬁrms.
In the theoretical literature on compliance with emissions taxes most authors simply assume that full compliance is not
or cannot be achieved [4,7,8,11,15]. This is also true in most theoretical analyses of the compliance and enforcement

 Corresponding author. Fax: +1 413 545 5853.

E-mail address: stranlund@resecon.umass.edu (J.K. Stranlund).
doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2008.12.002

ARTICLE IN PRESS
problem in emissions trading schemes [10,14,15,18].1 Without downplaying the relevance of examining the performance of
incentive-based policies when enforcement cannot induce full compliance, our work suggests that these situations may
involve sub-optimal policy designs.
Our assumption of a constant expected marginal penalty for tax evasion is not common in the theoretical literature on
compliance with incentive-based policies. Most authors assume expected penalties that are some combination of strictly convex
penalty functions, and probabilities of detecting violations that may depend on ﬁrms’ emissions reports, on the regulator’s
expectation of their emissions, or on their actual emissions. These assumptions are not justiﬁed by actual enforcement strategies.
Consequently, to examine the robustness of our full-compliance result, in Section 4 we ask whether it is possible to
reduce the expected enforcement costs of achieving an uncertain distribution of individual emissions with a non-constant
expected marginal penalty that results in some level of tax evasion. We ﬁnd that monitoring effort can be reduced, but only
if the probabilities of detecting ﬁrms’ violations can be based on observable correlates of their actual emissions. Whether
such a strategy reduces expected enforcement costs depends on the tradeoff between reduced monitoring costs and the
expected sanctioning costs that arise from punishing violations. Interestingly, ﬁrms’ emissions reports, a priori expectations
of their emissions, or strictly convex penalty functions are not useful in forming a cost-effective tax/enforcement policy.
Our third result comes from determining optimal ﬁrm-speciﬁc emissions taxes under the assumption that it is not possible
to improve on an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance. In Section 5 we show that discriminatory taxes are
optimal except when observable ﬁrm characteristics do not reveal any information about the variation in the ﬁrms’ marginal
abatement costs or the marginal costs of monitoring them for compliance. In this case, the regulator has such poor
information about individual ﬁrms that it cannot distinguish them from one another in a useful way. While this lack of
information is certainly characteristic of some pollution control settings, regulators will not be so ill-informed in others.
Particularly in developed countries, ﬁrms have been subject to environmental regulation for many years. Consequently, we
suspect that there are many situations in which prior experience has provided regulators with information about the costs of
monitoring ﬁrms, and may have allowed them to determine how observable ﬁrm characteristics (e.g., output, inputs,
abatement technologies, and production technologies, etc.) are jointly distributed with their abatement or monitoring costs.
With this information, even though it is incomplete, optimality requires discriminatory pollution prices.
We cannot claim that this result is entirely new. Cremer and Gahvari [4] also examine the optimal design of an emissions
tax that is costly to enforce, but they limit their analysis to policies that generate positive violations by all ﬁrms and they
assume complete information about ﬁrms’ abatement and enforcement costs. Their results suggest that tax rates may vary
across industries in part because of differences in enforcement and abatement costs. Besides showing that optimality will
often require full compliance, we extend Cremer and Gahvari’s work by determining the extent to which discriminatory
taxes remain optimal when regulators have incomplete information about abatement and enforcement costs.
Malik [13] provides an early hint that a uniform pollution price may be inefﬁcient when one accounts for enforcement
costs. He models a competitive emissions trading program under complete information that is enforced to achieve full
compliance, and demonstrates that emission trading leads to a distribution of emission control that does not minimize the
sum of aggregate abatement and enforcement costs. An important distinction between our work and Malik’s is that he is
concerned with the optimal distribution of emissions while we are concerned with the optimal distribution of emissions
prices. The approaches are clearly complementary, but our approach illuminates what we believe is the fundamental
reason for the sub-optimality of emissions trading: a competitive emissions trading policy leads to a uniform price, while
enforcement costs typically call for discriminatory prices.
An important consequence of this result is that when regulators have some knowledge about how abatement and
monitoring costs vary across ﬁrms, any emissions control policy that sets or generates a uniform price cannot be optimal. In
particular, the policies that drive our conventional wisdom about the value of incentive-based policies, like those involving
Pigouvian taxes and competitive emissions trading, are actually sub-optimal policies.2 But it is the single pollution price
that drives much of our understanding of incentive-based control and that leads to the most important reason for
implementing these policies, viz the ability of these policies to produce a distribution of individual emissions control that
minimizes the aggregate abatement costs of achieving some aggregate emissions target, even when the target cannot be
guaranteed because of incomplete information. A single pollution price motivates ﬁrms to choose emissions so that their
marginal abatement costs are equal in equilibrium, and this forms the set of necessary conditions for minimizing aggregate
abatement costs. Clearly, when it is optimal to set discriminatory prices, ﬁrms’ marginal abatement costs will differ, and
aggregate abatement costs will not be minimized. Thus, the main justiﬁcation for implementing policies that price
pollution is not valid when discriminatory prices are optimal.

2. A model of compliance behavior under emissions taxes
Throughout we consider a ﬁxed set of n heterogeneous risk-neutral ﬁrms. These ﬁrms may not belong to the same
industry, but each emits the same uniformly mixed pollutant. A regulator has incomplete information about the ﬁrms’
1

Some others in this literature restrict themselves to only full compliance outcomes [3,13,19].
Beyond the control of uniformly mixed pollutants from point sources, which is the setting for this work as well as all of the literature we discuss, it is
well known that discriminatory emissions taxes are optimal when pollutants are spatially differentiated [22, Chapter 2].
2

abatement costs, but we allow for the possibility that it can use observable characteristics of the ﬁrms to distinguish their
costs from one another. For example, past environmental control may have provided enough information to the regulator to
allow it to estimate the parameters of ﬁrms’ abatement costs as functions of observable production and abatement
technologies, or levels and kinds of inputs and outputs. Let the abatement cost function of ﬁrm i be C(qi, xi, ei), which is
strictly decreasing and strictly convex in its emissions qi. The variable ei is known to the ﬁrm but is a random variable from
the regulator’s perspective, and xi is a vector of observable characteristics of the ﬁrm. Note that the functional form of
abatement costs does not vary across ﬁrms, but individual abatement costs vary with differences in xi and ei.
Firm i’s emissions are taxed at rate ti. It is required to submit an emissions report, ri, and it is noncompliant if it reports
rioqi. The regulator cannot determine the ﬁrm’s compliance status without a costly audit. Let pi denote the probability that
the regulator is able to make this determination and suppose that it can judge a ﬁrm’s compliance without error. The
detection probability is common knowledge and the regulator commits to it at the outset. If monitoring reveals that i has
under-reported its emissions, it pays a unit penalty of fi on qiri40. Note that the expected penalty is linear under this
speciﬁcation. This assumption is not common in the literature, so we address the value of enforcement strategies that
produce alternative forms of the expected penalty function in Section 4.3 The unit penalty may vary among ﬁrms to allow
for the possibility that this may be part of an efﬁcient policy, but we restrict it to be no more than a maximal value f̄, which
does not vary. We also assume that fi 4ti throughout. This is a natural assumption because the penalty can be interpreted
as recovering evaded taxes plus a punitive element. More importantly, this assumption ensures that full compliance is a
possible outcome with less than certain monitoring.
To simplify our analysis we restrict it to policies that motivate all ﬁrms to reduce their emissions below what they
would release in the absence of regulatory control, but that do not cause any ﬁrm to choose zero emissions. Moreover, we
assume that each ﬁrm has sufﬁcient assets so that the total of its tax payment plus possible penalties cannot force it into
bankruptcy. Under these assumptions, ﬁrm i chooses its emissions and emissions report to solve
minðqi ;ri Þ Cðqi ; xi ; i Þ þ t i r i þ pi fi ðqi  r i Þ
qi  r i X0; r i X0.

(1)

s:t:

Restricting the ﬁrm to qi  r i X0 follows from the fact that a ﬁrm will never have an incentive to report that its emissions
are higher than they really are. Let L denote the Lagrange equation for (1) and let li denote the multiplier attached to the
constraint qiriX0. The following ﬁrst-order conditions are then both necessary and sufﬁcient to solve (1):

Lq ¼ C q ðqi ; xi ; i Þ þ pi fi  li ¼ 0,

(2)

Lr ¼ ti  pi fi þ li X0; ri X0; ri ðt i  pi fi þ li Þ ¼ 0,

(3)

Ll ¼ ðqi  ri Þp0; li X0; li ðqi  ri Þ ¼ 0.

(4)

Making the common assumption that a ﬁrm will comply if it is indifferent between compliance and noncompliance,
(3) reveals that a ﬁrm’s optimal emissions report is
(
ri ¼

qi

if t i ppi f;

0

if ti 4pi f:

(5)

Thus, the ﬁrm truthfully reports its emissions if and only if its tax does not exceed the expected marginal penalty. Some
may object to our formulation of the regulator’s enforcement strategy on the grounds that it is implausible that a regulator
would not react with an automatic audit if it received a report of zero emissions. While this is certainly true, we show in the
next section that it will never be optimal to set the enforcement parameters so that a ﬁrm reports zero emissions.
When t i ppi fi so that the ﬁrm truthfully reports its emissions, (3) becomes t i ¼ pi fi  li . Combining this with (2) yields
the familiar result that the ﬁrm chooses its emissions to equate its marginal abatement cost to the tax; i.e., C q ðqi ; xi ; i Þ ¼ t i :
However, when t i 4pi fi and the ﬁrm under-reports its emissions, (4) indicates that ll ¼ 0. In this case (2) becomes
C q ðqi ; xi ; i Þ ¼ pi fi ; i.e., a noncompliant ﬁrm chooses its emissions to equate its marginal abatement cost to the expected
marginal penalty. Thus, a ﬁrm’s optimal choice of emissions is
(
qi ¼

qðt i ; xi ; i Þ

j C q ðqi ; xi ; i Þ þ ti ¼ 0

if t i ppi fi ;

qðpi fi ; xi ; i Þ

j C q ðqi ; xi ; i Þ þ pi fi ¼ 0

if t i 4pi fi :

(6)

3
Linear penalties are common, however, for actual emissions trading schemes [2]. There is less documented evidence for actual emissions taxes.
However, Poland’s sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide taxes impose a constant ﬁne of 10 times the tax for noncompliance [23]. Under Sweden’s tax on NOx,
violators pay their unreported tax liability plus interest (personal communication with Claes Englund, ofﬁcer of the Swedish NOx program). While this
may not appear to be much of a deterrent, for our purposes all that matters is that it is a linear ﬁne.

3. The costs of enforcing emissions taxes and the optimality of full compliance
The regulatory objective of this paper is to choose ﬁrm-speciﬁc emissions taxes and enforcement strategies to minimize
the expected social costs of the regulation. These costs include the regulator’s expectations of aggregate abatement costs,
pollution damage, and enforcement costs. In this section we show how a tax/enforcement policy with a constant expected
marginal penalty should be designed to minimize the expected enforcement costs of inducing an arbitrary and imperfectly
known set of individual emissions.
We allow the costs of monitoring to vary across ﬁrms. Plant location may affect inspection costs and plants with more
discharge points may be harder to monitor than others. Moreover, the variation in ﬁrms’ abatement and production
technologies, particularly if they belong to different industries, may also produce variation in monitoring costs. As with
ﬁrms’ abatement costs, the regulator is uncertain about the costs of monitoring individual ﬁrms, but it might possess
information about how monitoring costs are correlated with observable ﬁrm characteristics. Consequently, let the cost of
monitoring ﬁrm i be m(pi, xi, mi), which is increasing in the detection probability pi. The regulator is uncertain about
monitoring costs because it cannot observe the parameter mi, but it may have some information about how these costs vary
with the ﬁrms’ observables xi. We assume that aggregate monitoring costs are the sum of the individual monitoring costs
P
functions; thus, the conditional expectation of aggregate monitoring costs is Eð mðpi ; xi ; mi ÞÞ, where E denotes the
expectation operator and summations are over all regulated ﬁrms throughout the paper.
Tax and penalty revenues are simple transfers with no real effects. Despite this, society is not indifferent about
collecting them; in particular, penalizing noncompliant ﬁrms may involve signiﬁcant costs. These include the government’s
costs of generating evidence to get a court to agree with its ﬁnding of a violation and of imposing a penalty. Accused ﬁrms
may mount costly challenges to a sanction, and the government may respond with its own costly efforts to ﬁght off these
challenges.4 On the other hand, a compliant ﬁrm reports the full extent of its emissions and, in doing so, admits liability for
these emissions. With this admission the government does not need to generate the evidence that would be necessary to
impose a penalty. Moreover, a ﬁrm that admits its liability is not likely to challenge the imposition of the tax.
Therefore, we assume that collecting taxes is costless, but that si40 is the cost of collecting the penalty from ﬁrm i if it is
caught evading its tax liability. Like the costs of monitoring individual ﬁrms, the regulator may not have complete information
about the costs of collecting penalties from individual ﬁrms. Although si may be a function of the size of the ﬁrm’s penalty and
possibly its observable characteristics, our results do not depend on specifying these relationships. We do, however, assume
that the aggregate expected cost of collecting penalties is linear in the costs of collecting penalties from individual ﬁrms.5
Despite our weak assumptions about the expected costs of enforcing emissions taxes, we are able to prove the following
proposition concerning the optimal enforcement of these policies.
Proposition 1. Consider a tax/enforcement policy ðti ; pi ; fi Þ, i ¼ 1, y, n, with t i ofi pf̄ for each i. Suppose that ﬁrms react to
this policy with emissions qi, i ¼ 1, y, n. This distribution of emissions is achieved with minimum expected aggregate
enforcement costs only if t i ¼ pi f̄ for each i ¼ 1, y, n. With taxes and monitoring set in this way, each ﬁrm is compliant.
Proof. The proof proceeds by ﬁrst showing that any policy involving t i api fi for some i can be modiﬁed to reduce expected
enforcement costs without changing the distribution of emissions. First suppose that ti 4pi fi for some i. Then, (5) and (6)
indicate ri ¼ 0 and qi ¼ qðpi fi ; xi ; i Þ. Alternatively, hold pi constant so that aggregate monitoring costs do not change, but
reduce ti so that ti ¼ pifi. The ﬁrm will then choose ri ¼ qi so that it is now compliant, but it does not change it emissions
because qðpi fi ; xi ; i Þ ¼ qðt i ; xi ; i Þ. Changing ti in this way does not affect the decisions of the other ﬁrms. However, it
eliminates the expected costs of penalizing i, thereby reducing aggregate enforcement costs. Now suppose that t i opi fi for
some i. (5) and (6) reveal that the ﬁrm is compliant so that r i ¼ qðt i ; xi ; i Þ. However, reducing pi so that ti ¼ pifi reduces
aggregate monitoring costs without changing the ﬁrm’s emissions and compliance choices, or the decisions of the other
ﬁrms. Hence, minimizing expected aggregate enforcement costs requires ti ¼ pifi for each i. Moreover, aggregate
monitoring costs are minimized by setting the individual penalties as high as possible. &
It is important to note that the proposition holds despite the regulator’s uncertainty about the ﬁrms’ abatement costs.
Although this uncertainty implies that the regulator does not know the exact distribution of individual emissions that will
result from a particular policy, the expected enforcement costs of holding the ﬁrms to whatever distribution of emissions is
produced are minimized by choosing t i ¼ pi f̄, i ¼ 1, y, n. Moreover, the proposition holds despite the regulator’s uncertainty
about monitoring and sanctioning costs. All the regulator has to know is that aggregate monitoring costs are increasing in
individual monitoring levels, and aggregate sanctioning costs are increasing in the costs of penalizing individual ﬁrms.6
4
Although it is reasonable to assume that imposing sanctions is costly, no work in the literature on enforcing emissions taxes that we are aware of
deals with these costs. In the literature on enforcing emissions trading, only Stranlund [20] assumes that collecting penalties is costly. Assuming costly
sanctions is slightly more common in the literature on enforcing emissions standards [1,12] and in the larger literature on optimal law enforcement [16].
5
Any enforcement strategy will also involve ﬁxed costs. Adding these costs does not change our results as long as they are not so high that it is
optimal to forego regulation altogether.
6
Clearly, inducing full compliance requires the regulator to commit to a monitoring strategy. A few authors have modelled enforcement of
environmental regulations when a regulator cannot commit to monitoring strategies [5,6]. We maintain the more common assumption of regulatory
commitment, because there is clear value to the ability to commit, and we observe real cases in which regulators do commit to enforcement strategies
that achieve full (or nearly full) compliance (e.g. EPA’s SO2 and NOx Trading programs).

The cost effectiveness of inducing full compliance depends on three assumptions that differ from the rest of the
literature on enforcing incentive-based environmental policies. Our assumption that it is costly to collect penalties from
noncompliant ﬁrms is crucial, because the fundamental value of inducing full compliance is to avoid these costs. In the
absence of sanctioning costs, Proposition 1 does not hold because society would be completely indifferent between
allowing noncompliance and inducing full compliance. Moreover, we have given the regulator the freedom to choose ﬁrmspeciﬁc tax rates. All others assume a uniform tax rate that is often ﬁxed. Finally, no one else to our knowledge speciﬁes
enforcement strategies that produce constant expected marginal penalties. We now examine the robustness of our fullcompliance policy recommendation under non-constant expected marginal penalties.
4. The robustness of the optimality of full compliance
The focus on positive violation choices in the literature on emissions tax enforcement is accomplished in part with
expected marginal penalties that are functions of the ﬁrms’ choices of emissions, emissions reports, and evaded taxes. For
example, Harford [7,8] and Sandmo [17] assume expected penalties of the form pi ðqi ; r i Þf i ðqi  ri Þ, where fi is a strictly
convex penalty function.7 In this section we ask if a regulator can reduce expected enforcement costs by designing a tax/
enforcement policy with a non-constant expected marginal penalty that results in some level of tax evasion. Since
aggregate expected monitoring and sanctioning costs are linear in the costs of monitoring and sanctioning individual ﬁrms,
we address this question from the perspective of alternative policies for a single ﬁrm and apply the result in the aggregate.
It is useful to introduce a small amount of new notation for this section. Denote a tax/enforcement policy for ﬁrm i as pi,
consisting of a tax and expected penalty function, under which the ﬁrm optimally chooses its emissions q(pi,xi,ei) and
emissions report r(pi,xi,ei). Using the ﬁrm’s decision criterion, the regulator can form conditional expectations of the ﬁrm’s
emissions and emissions report, q̄ðpi Þ ¼ Eðqðpi ; xi ; i ÞÞ and r̄ðpi Þ ¼ Eðrðpi ; xi ; i ÞÞ.
We consider three policies that induce the same expected emissions from the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst is the policy of Proposition 1,
which we denote as pci ¼ ½t ci ; pci fi ðqi  r i Þ. We do not set the unit penalty at its maximum level in this section because, as
will be clear shortly, our analysis depends on being able to vary fi. However, we maintain our assumption that ti ofi . Recall
that motivating the ﬁrm to be compliant with minimal monitoring requires tci ¼ pci fi . The regulator’s conditional
expectation of the ﬁrm’s emissions under pci is q̄ðpci Þ.
The other policies, pqi ¼ ½t qi ; pi ðqi ; r i Þf i ðqi  r i Þ and pq̄i ¼ ½t q̄i ; pi ðq̄ðpq̄i Þ; r i Þf i ðqi  r i Þ, feature non-constant expected marginal

penalties. Under pqi, the detection probability is based in part on the ﬁrm’s actual emissions. Of course, it is not possible to
do this directly because a ﬁrm’s emissions are unknown until it is actually audited. Sandmo [17] recognizes this, but
justiﬁes conditioning monitoring on a ﬁrm’s emissions by assuming that emissions produce observable correlates that a
regulator can use to allocate its monitoring effort. Perhaps higher emissions are associated with more smoke leaving a
pollution source, or elevated ambient concentrations of a pollutant can be linked to emissions from a particular source.
When emissions do not have such observable correlates an alternative is that the regulator forms an expectation of the
ﬁrm’s emissions and uses it to reﬁne its monitoring strategy [14]. This leads to policy pq̄i, under which the detection
probability is conditioned on the regulator’s expectation of the ﬁrm’s emissions q̄ðpq̄i Þ.
0
To simplify our analysis we assume that the functional forms of pi and fi are the same under pqi and pq̄i , and that pi and f i
are linear functions. The latter assumptions imply that the regulator’s prior expectation of the detection probability will
have to maintain under policy pi 2 ðpqi ; pq̄i Þ is E½pðqðpi ; xi ; i Þ; rðpi ; xi ; i ÞÞ ¼ pðq̄ðpi Þ; r̄ðpi ÞÞ, and that its expectation of the ﬁrm’s
0
0
marginal penalty is E½f ðqðpi ; xi ; i Þ  rðpi ; xi ; i ÞÞ ¼ f ðq̄ðpi Þ  r̄ðpi ÞÞ.8
The results of this section are based on comparisons of the detection probability under pci to the regulator’s expectations
of the detection probabilities under pqi and pq̄i that induce the same expected emissions from the ﬁrm. Clearly, detection
probabilities are easily adjusted by changing marginal penalties. So that our results do not depend on arbitrary differences
in marginal penalties, we assume that the equilibrium expected marginal penalties under pqi and pq̄i are equal to the
0
marginal penalty under pci ; i.e., fi ¼ f ðq̄ðpi Þ  r̄ðpi ÞÞ for pi 2 ðpqi ; pq̄i Þ. Under these conditions we obtain the following
proposition, which is proved in the Appendix A.
Proposition 2. Suppose that a regulator wishes to induce a ﬁxed level of expected emissions from a ﬁrm. Relative to inducing the
ﬁrm’s compliance with a constant expected marginal penalty, a regulator can reduce its expected monitoring of the ﬁrm if and
only if the probability of detection is a strictly increasing function of the ﬁrm’s actual emissions and the regulator implements an
enforcement strategy that it expects will result in the ﬁrm’s noncompliance.
Proposition 2 does not imply that making detection probabilities increasing functions of the ﬁrms’ actual emissions and
allowing them to be noncompliant will lead to lower expected enforcement costs. This will happen only when the expected
value of reduced monitoring effort outweighs the additional expected costs of penalizing noncompliance; however, there is
7
Malik [14] and vanEgteren and Weber [21] assume the same form in the context of emissions trading, except that a ﬁrm’s permit holding substitutes
for its emissions report.
8
Obviously, we must have pðq̄ðpi Þ; r̄ðpi ÞÞ 2 ½0; 1. The upper bound constraint is satisﬁed in our analysis because we are looking for the possibility that
pðq̄ðpi Þ; r̄ðpi ÞÞopci , and pci o1 because of our assumption that tci ofi . Moreover, pðq̄ðpi Þ; r̄ðpi ÞÞ must be greater than zero to achieve the emissions reduction
achieved by pci .

nothing in our model that guarantees this. Moreover, it may not be possible to base a monitoring strategy on a ﬁrm’s actual
emissions. We have already noted that a regulator cannot do this directly because a ﬁrm’s emissions are hidden until it is
actually audited. It may be possible to do so indirectly if emissions have observable correlates that a regulator can use to
reﬁne its monitoring strategy, but not all types of emissions have such useful correlates. Thus, the opportunities to use
noncompliance to reduce expected enforcement costs may be quite limited. Certainly, these opportunities are much more
limited than what is implied by the existing literature.9
An interesting corollary of Proposition 2 is that a regulator cannot use a ﬁrm’s emissions report, its a priori expectation
of the ﬁrm’s emissions, or a strictly convex penalty function to reduce its monitoring effort below the effort required to
induce the ﬁrm’s compliance with a constant expected marginal penalty. These are new results that clarify the value of
elements of enforcement strategies that are commonly assumed by others. Loosening our assumptions that the monitoring
and marginal penalty functions are linear may reveal avenues for using these elements to reduce monitoring effort. We
leave this issue for future investigation.
5. Optimal emission taxes under incomplete information and costly enforcement
Given our obvious pessimism about the value of using ﬁrms’ noncompliance to reduce the expected costs of enforcing
emissions taxes, in this section we incorporate the full compliance strategy of Proposition 1 to determine optimal
emissions taxes under incomplete information and costly enforcement. Our primary focus now is on whether an optimal
policy involves discriminatory taxes or whether a regulator should set a single tax that applies to all ﬁrms.
P
Suppose that pollution damage is an imperfectly known, increasing function of aggregate emissions, Dð qi ; dÞ, where d
is a random variable. The regulator knows the joint distribution of the ﬁrms’ unknown abatement and monitoring cost
parameters, their observable characteristics, and the unknown damage parameter. With this knowledge it forms a
conditional expectation of the social costs of pollution and its control:
nX 
X
o
 X 

(7)
m pi ; xi ; mi þ D
qi ; d .
E
C qi ; x i ;  i þ
Since the regulator will enforce the optimal policy so that all ﬁrms are compliant, from Proposition 1 it constrains the
minimization of (7) by choosing ti ¼ pi f̄; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. From (6), under this policy the regulator knows that the ﬁrms will
choose their emissions so that C q ðqi ; xi ; i Þ þ t i ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, which implicitly deﬁne their emissions as qi ¼ qðt i ; xi ; i Þ,
i ¼ 1, y, n. Substituting t i ¼ pi f̄ and qi ¼ qðt i ; xi ; i Þ, i ¼ 1, y, n, into (7) gives us the regulator’s conditional expectation of
social costs in terms of well-enforced, ﬁrm-speciﬁc tax rates:
nX
X
o
X 

m t i =f̄; xi ; mi þ D
qðt i ; xi ; i Þ; d
E
Cðqðt i ; xi ; i Þ; xi ; i Þ þ
(8)
To make sure that each detection probability is not greater than one, individual taxes are constrained by t i pf̄; i ¼
1; . . . ; n: Assuming that (8) is strictly convex in (t1,y,tn) and that optimality calls for individual taxes that are strictly greater
than zero and strictly less than f̄, the following ﬁrst-order conditions uniquely identify the optimal tax rates:
EðC q ðqðt k ; xk ; k Þ; xk ; k Þqt ðt k ; xk ; k ÞÞ þ Eðmp ðt k =f̄; xk ; mk ÞÞ=f̄
X

qðt i ; xi ; i Þ; dÞqt ðt k ; xk ; k Þ ¼ 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ; n.
þ EðD0
In these equations, qt ðt k ; xk ; k Þ is the marginal effect of the tax on ﬁrm k’s emissions and Eðmp ðt k =f̄; xk ; mk ÞÞ=f̄ is the
regulator’s conditional expectation of the marginal effect of the tax on the cost of monitoring the ﬁrm. Substitute
C q ðqk ; xk ; k Þ þ t k ¼ 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ; n, into the ﬁrst-order conditions and rearrange the results to obtain
P
EðD0 ð qðt i ; xi ; i Þ; dÞqt ðt k ; xk ; k ÞÞ Eðmp ðt k =f̄; xk ; mk ÞÞ
þ
; k ¼ 1; . . . ; n.
(9)
tk ¼
Eðqt ðt k ; xk ; k ÞÞ
f̄Eðqt ðtk ; xk ; k ÞÞ
Using the deﬁnition of the covariance between random variables, the ﬁrst terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (9) are
 X
 CovðD0 P qðt ; x ;  Þ; d; q ðt ; x ;  ÞÞ
i i i
t k k k
qðt i ; xi ; i Þ; d þ
; k ¼ 1; . . . ; n,
(10)
E D0
Eðqt ðt k ; xk ; k ÞÞ
where Cov denotes the covariance operator. Moreover, use C q ðqk ; xk ; k Þ þ t k ¼ 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ; n,
qt ðt k ; xk ; k Þ ¼ 1=C qq ðqk ; xk ; k Þ; k ¼ 1; . . . ; n. Substitute these and (10) into (9) to obtain
 X
 CovðD0 P qðt ; x ;  Þ; d; 1=C ðq ; x ;  ÞÞ
qq k k k
i i i
qðt i ; xi ; i Þ; d þ
t k ¼ E D0
Eð1=C qq ðqk ; xk ; k ÞÞ
þ

Eðmp ðt k =f̄; xk ; mk ÞÞ
; k ¼ 1; . . . ; n.
f̄Eð1=C qq ðqk ; xk ; k ÞÞ

to

obtain

(11)

9
An anonymous reviewer suggested that we could interpret our detection probability as the probability of detecting and punishing noncompliant
choices. If the likelihood of conviction is increasing in the size of a ﬁrm’s violation, then a regulator may be able to exploit an increasing likelihood of
punishing violators to reduce its monitoring effort.

Note that the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the regulator’s expectation of marginal damage. Since this term appears
in all of the equations in (11), our ﬁnal proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 3. An optimal policy of well-enforced emissions taxes under uncertainty about ﬁrms’ abatement costs, their
monitoring costs, and pollution damage involves discriminatory taxes if and only if
P
Eðmp ðt j =f̄; xj ; mj ÞÞ
CovðD0 ð qðt i ; xi ; i Þ; dÞ; 1=C qq ðqj ; xj ; j ÞÞ
þ
Eð1=C qq ðqj ; xj ; j ÞÞ
f̄Eð1=C qq ðqj ; xj ; j ÞÞ
P
CovðD0 ð qðt i ; xi ; i Þ; dÞ; 1=C qq ðqk ; xk ; k ÞÞ
Eðmp ðt k =f̄; xk ; mk ÞÞ
a
þ
,
(12)
Eð1=C qq ðqk ; xk ; k ÞÞ
f̄Eð1=C qq ðqk ; xk ; k ÞÞ
for some j and k.
Proposition 3 indicates that there are three potential sources of variation in optimal individual emissions taxes: variation
in the regulator’s conditional expectations of the marginal costs of monitoring the ﬁrms, Eðmp ðt k =f̄; xk ; mk ÞÞ; k ¼ 1; . . . ; n;
variation in its conditional expectations of the reciprocal of the slopes of the ﬁrms’ marginal abatement cost functions,
Eð1=C qq ðqk ; xk ; k ÞÞ; k ¼ 1,y,n, and variation in the covariances between marginal damage and the reciprocal of the slopes
of the ﬁrms’ marginal abatement cost functions. Note that when the ﬁrms’ observable characteristics do not provide the
regulator with any information about the variation of the slopes of the ﬁrms’ marginal abatement costs or the marginal
costs of monitoring them for compliance, the terms on both sides of Eq. (12) do not vary across ﬁrms, and the regulator
chooses a uniform tax because it cannot distinguish the ﬁrms from one another. Thus, very poor information about
individual ﬁrms would be the fundamental justiﬁcation for setting a uniform tax to control a uniformly mixed pollutant.
When a regulator has some information about individual ﬁrms, their optimal tax rates will vary. The ﬁrst terms on both
sides of (12) are interesting because they do not depend at all on the costs of enforcement. That is, even if one assumes zero
enforcement costs, incomplete information about ﬁrms’ abatement costs can produce variation in optimal tax rates when
the regulator has some information that allows it to distinguish the slopes of the ﬁrms’ marginal abatement cost functions
from one another.10
We are mainly interested in how enforcement costs induce discriminatory taxes, which is captured by the variation in
Eðmp ðt k =f̄; xk ; mk ÞÞ=f̄Eð1=C qq ðqk ; xk ; k ÞÞ, k ¼ 1, y, n. Since this term is negative, the optimal tax on a ﬁrm will tend to be
lower as this term is lower. This is intuitive because it reﬂects the regulator’s conditional expectation of the increase in
monitoring costs associated with inducing lower emissions from a ﬁrm with a well-enforced tax. Inducing a marginal
decrease in the emissions of a ﬁrm with a more steeply sloped marginal abatement cost curve (i.e., higher C qq ðqk ; xk ; k Þ)
requires a relatively greater increase in its tax and, consequently, a relatively greater increase in monitoring to maintain the
ﬁrm’s compliance. Therefore, to conserve monitoring costs, optimal taxes will tend to be lower for ﬁrms that the regulator
expects have steeper marginal abatement cost functions. For the same reason, tax rates will tend to be lower for ﬁrms that
the regulator expects are more difﬁcult to monitor, and hence, have higher marginal monitoring costs.
Suppose that the slopes of the ﬁrms’ marginal abatement cost functions vary and the regulator has some information
about this variation. Then the optimal tax rates will vary across the ﬁrms even if their monitoring cost functions do not
vary. Thus, discriminatory taxes do not require variation in monitoring costs. This is noteworthy because it implies that
recognizing that enforcement is costly will often be sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for imposing discriminatory taxes.
Admittedly, the number of distinct tax rates may be small if a regulator has only coarse information about individual
ﬁrms. For example, suppose that a control situation involves the ﬁrms from a number of industries and that the regulator
knows something about how monitoring or abatement costs differ across the industries, but is unable to distinguish ﬁrms
within industries. In this case the number of distinct tax rates may simply be equal to the number of industries involved.
Or, imagine a setting involving the emissions of the ﬁrms in a single industry that use only a small number of distinct
abatement technologies to control their emissions. If this piece of information is the only characteristic that a regulator can
use to distinguish the ﬁrms’ abatement or monitoring costs, the number of tax rates may be equal to the number of
available control technologies. Depending on the degree of heterogeneity in the population of regulated ﬁrms, more
detailed information about each of them may lead to a greater number of distinct tax rates.11
6. Conclusion
We have examined the optimal pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly and regulators have
incomplete information about ﬁrms’ abatement costs and the costs of enforcement. We have argued that optimality
requires sufﬁcient enforcement resources to induce full compliance by all ﬁrms, except possibly when the probabilities of
detecting violations are increasing functions of observable correlates of their actual emissions. Moreover, enforcement
10
To our knowledge, the result that uncertainty about abatement costs by itself can produce discriminatory pollution prices is new. Given the focus of
this paper on enforcement costs we do not explore this issue in depth here, but we think that it is an interesting area for future research.
11
We recognize that differentiated taxes can produce moral hazard problems. In our model a ﬁrm faces a lower tax than another if the regulator’s
expectation of the marginal monitoring costs associated with inducing a lower level of emissions is higher. This may lead ﬁrms to attempt to lower their
tax rates by investing in reducing their ‘‘monitorability,’’ as in Heyes [9]. This issue deserves further investigation.
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costs will typically induce discriminatory pollution prices, except when regulators have very poor information about
individual ﬁrms. When regulators have at least some information about how monitoring and abatement costs vary across
ﬁrms, conventional incentive-based policies like Pigouvian taxes and competitive emissions trading are inefﬁcient.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2
A policy pci ¼ ½tci ; pci fi ðqi  ri Þ motivates the ﬁrm to report its true level of emissions because t ci ¼ pci fi . Under pci the ﬁrm
chooses its emissions so that C q ðqi ; xi ; i Þ ¼ t ci , from which the regulator forms its expectation of the ﬁrm’s emissions
Eðqðt ci ; xi ; i ÞÞ ¼ q̄ðpci Þ. Substitute this into C q ðqi ; xi ; i Þ ¼ t ci to obtain the identity EðC q ðq̄ðpci Þ; xi ; i ÞÞ  t ci .
Under pqi ¼ ½t qi ; pi ðqi ; r i Þf ðqi  r i Þ, the ﬁrm’s costs are Cðqi ; xi ; i Þ þ t qi r i þ pi ðqi ; r i Þf i ðqi  r i Þ. Assuming that this function is
strictly convex in (qi,ri), and the ﬁrm chooses qi40, ri40, and qiriX0, its optimal qi and ri are determined from
0

C q ðqi ; xi ; i Þ þ ð@pi =@qi Þf i ðqi  r i Þ þ pi ðqi ; r i Þf i ðqi  r i Þ  li ¼ 0,

(A.1)

t qi þ ð@pi =@ri Þf i ðqi  r i Þ  pi ðqi ; r i Þf i ðqi  r i Þ þ li ¼ 0,

(A.2)

0

ðqi  r i Þp0; li X0; li ðqi  r i Þ ¼ 0,

(A.3)

where, li is a Lagrange multiplier. From (A.1) to (A.3) the regulator calculates
which upon substitution into (A.1) and (A.2) yields

Eðqðpqi ; xi ; i ÞÞ



¼

q̄ðpqi Þ

and

Eðrðpqi ; xi ; i ÞÞ

¼ r̄ðpqi Þ,



EðC q ðq̄ðpqi Þ; xi ; i ÞÞ þ ð@pi =@qi Þf i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ þ pi ðq̄ðpqi Þ; r̄ðpqi ÞÞf i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ  li  0,

(A.4)

tqi þ ð@pi =@ri Þf i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ  pi ðq̄ðpqi Þ; r̄ðpqi ÞÞf i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ þ li  0.

(A.5)

0

0

Combine (A.4) and (A.5) to obtain
EðC q ðq̄ðpqi Þ; xi ; i ÞÞ  t qi þ ð@pi =@qi þ @pi =@r i Þf i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ.
pqi

pci

and
produce the same expected emissions from the ﬁrm, then
If
EðC q ðq̄ðpci Þ; xi ; i ÞÞ. Thus, Eq. (A.6) and EðC q ðq̄ðpci Þ; xi ; i ÞÞ  t ci yields

(A.6)
pqi

is constructed so that

EðC q ðq̄ðpqi Þ; xi ; i ÞÞ



tqi ¼ t ci  ð@pi =@qi þ @pi =@r i Þf i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ.
pci

¼

(A.7)

to the expected detection probability under
To compare the detection probability under
(A.7) and substitute the result into (A.5) to obtain

pqi,

substitute

pci fi  pi ðq̄ðpqi Þ; r̄ðpqi ÞÞf 0i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ ¼ ð@pi =@qi Þf i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ  li .

t ci

c
i fi

¼p

into

(A.8)
0
f i ðq̄ðpqi Þ

r̄ðpqi ÞÞ


into (A.8) and
So that our results do not depend on the difference in marginal penalties, substitute fi ¼
rearrange terms to obtain pci  pi ðq̄ðpqi Þ; r̄ðpqi ÞÞ ¼ ½ð@pi =@qi Þf i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ  li =fi . Since liX0 and li ¼ 0 when q̄ðpqi Þ

r̄ðpqi Þ40, pi ðq̄ðpqi Þ; r̄ðpqi ÞÞopci if and only if ð@pi =@qi Þf i ðq̄ðpqi Þ  r̄ðpqi ÞÞ40. Clearly, this requires that the regulator expects the

ﬁrm to be noncompliant and that the probability of detection under pqi is a strictly increasing function of the ﬁrm’s
emissions.
We now compare the detection probabilities under pci ¼ ½t ci ; pci fi  and pq̄i ¼ ½t q̄i ; pi ðq̄ðpq̄i Þ; r i Þf i ðqi  r i Þ. Under pq̄i the
regulator calculates q̄ðpq̄i Þ and commits to pi ðq̄ðpq̄i Þ; r i Þ at the outset. Consequently, the ﬁrm treats q̄ðpq̄i Þ as a constant,
implying @pi =@qi ¼ 0. Then, proceeding as above, it is easy to derive pci  pi ðq̄ðpq̄i Þ; r̄ðpq̄i ÞÞ ¼ li =fi . Since liX0,

pci ppi ðq̄ðpq̄i Þ; r̄ðpq̄i ÞÞ, which indicates that the expected probability of detection under pq̄i cannot be less than the probability

of detection under pci. &
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[3] C.A. Chávez, J.K. Stranlund, Enforcing transferable permit systems in the presence of market power, Environ. Resource Econ. 25 (2003) 65–78.
[4] H. Cremer, F. Gahvari, Imperfect observability of emissions and second-best emission and output taxes, J. Public Econ. 85 (2002) 385–407.
[5] L. Franckx, The use of ambient inspections in environmental monitoring and enforcement when the inspection agency cannot commit itself to
announced inspection probabilities, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 43 (2002) 71–92.
[6] R.E. Grieson, N. Singh, Regulating externalities through testing, J. Public Econ. 41 (1990) 369–387.
[7] J. Harford, Self-reporting of pollution and the ﬁrm’s behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 14 (1987) 293–303.
[8] J. Harford, Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 5 (1978) 26–43.
[9] A. Heyes, Environmental enforcement when ‘‘inspectability’’ is endogenous: a model with overshooting properties, Environ. Resource Econ. 4 (1994)
479–494.
[10] A. Keeler, Noncompliant ﬁrms in transferable discharge permit markets: some extensions, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 21 (1991) 180–189.
[11] I. Macho-Stadler, D. Perez-Castrillo, Optimal enforcement policy and ﬁrm’s emissions and compliance with environmental taxes, J. Environ. Econ.
Manage. 51 (2006) 110–131.
[12] A.S. Malik, Self reporting and the design of policies for regulating stochastic pollution, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 24 (1993) 241–257.
[13] A.S. Malik, Enforcement cost and the choice of policy instruments for controlling pollution, Econ. Inquiry 30 (1992) 714–721.
[14] A.S. Malik, Markets for pollution control when ﬁrms are noncompliant, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 18 (1990) 97–106.
[15] J.-P. Montero, Prices versus quantities with incomplete enforcement, J. Public Econ. 85 (2002) 435–454.
[16] A.M. Polinsky, S. Shavell, Enforcement costs and the optimal magnitude and probability of ﬁnes, J. Law Econ. 35 (1992) 133–148.
[17] A. Sandmo, Efﬁcient environmental policy with imperfect compliance, Environ. Resource Econ. 23 (2002) 85–103.
[18] J.K. Stranlund, K.K. Dhanda, Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 38 (1999)
267–282.
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